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PAUL R. PANTHER
Deputy Attorney General
Chief, Criminal Law Division
KENNETH K. JORGENS
Deputy Attorney General
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010
(208) 334-4534
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
Plaintiff-Respondent-Cross Appellant,)
)
v.
)
)
CHARL YNDA LYNN GOGGIN,
)

No. 40554
Ada Co. Case No.
CR-2011-15480

SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF

)

Defendant-Appellant-Cross
Respondent.

)
)

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The statement of the case is set forth in the Brief of Respondent, p. 1, and
is incorporated here by reference. This Court granted Goggin leave to file a
supplemental brief by

1

The Order treated the
. The state

dated May 14, 2014.1

argument in Goggin's motion as the supplemental
"
cites to the motion as Goggin's

1

in her supplemental
ical

but in that

AM-2201, one of the

formulations of synthetic marijuana

is a controlled substance is a

question

therefore the jury instructions were fundamentally erroneous

for not submitting such to the jury (a new issue), the state's evidence was
insufficient to show that AM-2201 was a controlled substance (supplementing an
issue raised in the Appellant's brief), and alternatively that she should get a new
trial to assert a mistake of law defense (also supplementing an issue raised in the
Appellant's brief). The state characterizes the new issue as:
4.

Has Goggin failed to demonstrate that the trial court committed
fundamental error in the jury instructions or that she is entitled to an
acquittal or new trial?

2

As AM-2201 Is A Controlled Substance Is A Factual Question
A.

Introduction
Relying upon the Idaho Court of Appeals' decision in

Idaho 972, 318

==-,-,--=--::.c=-:t-'

1

3d 962 (Ct. App. 2014), Goggin asserts that whether AM-2201

is a controlled substance is a question of fact, rather than one of law.
(Supplemental brief, pp. 3-5.)

From this premise she extrapolates that it was

fundamental error for the jury instructions to inform the jury that AM-2201 and
two other formulations of synthetic marijuana (which Goggin does not dispute are
controlled substances as a matter of law) are controlled substances as a matter
of law (supplemental brief, pp. 5-8), that she is entitled to an acquittal based on
insufficient evidence that AM-2201 is a controlled substance (supplemental brief,
pp. 8-10); and that she is entitled to a new trial to allow her to submit a mistake of
law defense to this factual question (supplemental brief, pp. 10-11).

This

argument fails because whether synthetic marijuana containing the formulation
AM-2201 is a controlled substance is a legal, not a factual question. Even if it
were a factual question, Goggin has failed to show fundamental error in the jury
instructions, insufficiency of the evidence, or error in the denial of her motion for
a new trial to assert a mistake of law defense.

B.

Standard Of Review
interpretation and construction of a statute present questions of
free review.

over which the

3

State v. Thompson, 1

796,

,1

P.3d

=~..:....:.-:=~, 140 Idaho

1115,1117
2004).

"In

we will uphold a judgment of

sufficiency of

conviction entered upon a jury verdict so long as there is substantial evidence
upon

a rational trier of fact could conclude that the prosecution proved all

essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Jones, 154
Idaho 412, 417, 299 P.3d 219, 224 (2013) (internal quotations omitted).

The

appellate court will not substitute its view "as to the credibility of the witnesses,
the weight to be given to the testimony, and the reasonable inferences to be
drawn from the evidence." State v. Chacon, 145 Idaho 814,818, 186 P.3d 670,
674 (Ct. App. 2008).
Whether a jury was properly instructed is a question of law over which the
appellate court exercises free review. State v. Draper, 151 Idaho 576, 587-88,
261 P.3d 853, 864-65 (2011) (citing State v. Humphreys, 134 Idaho 657, 659, 8
P.3d 652, 654 (2000)).

C.

The Question Of Whether Synthetic Marijuana Containing The Specific
Chemical Formulation AM-2201 Is A Controlled Substance Is A Legal
Question, Not A Factual One
"When interpreting statutes we begin with the literal words of a statute,

which are the best guide to determining legislative intent." Leavitt v. Craven, 154
Idaho 661, 667, 302 P.3d 1, 7 (2012) (internal quotes, brackets and citation
omitted). If the plain language of the statute is unambiguous, "legislative history
and other extrinsic evidence shouid not be consulted for the purpose of altering
the clearly expressed intent of the legislature."

4

P.3d 502, 506 (2011).

Regional Medica! Center, 151 Idaho

613
"not at liberty to d

Code"). An

the plain language

is not created merely because "two different interpretations of a statute are
presented ,"

a

is ambiguous only where the "meaning is so

or

obscure that reasonable minds might be uncertain or disagree as to its meaning."
Farmers Nat. Bank v. Green River Dairy, LLC, 155 Idaho 853, _ , 318 P.3d
622, 625 (2014) (quotations and citations omitted). Moreover, legislative intent,
including the analysis of the plain language, "should be derived from a reading of
the whole act at issue."

lsi (quotation

and citation omitted).

Goggin was indicted for delivery of a controlled substance in violation of
I.C. § 37-2732(a). (R., pp. 490, 494.) That statute provides that "it is unlawful for
any person to ... deliver ... a controlled substance."

I.C. § 37-2732(a).

The

penalty for the crime is defined based on what schedule the drug falls in, with
delivery of a Schedule I nonnarcotic drug being a felony. I.C. § 37-2732(a)(8).
Thus, the elements of the crime are delivery of a Schedule I nonnarcotic
controlled substance.

Schedule I, in turn, includes as a hallucinogenic

(nonnarcotic) controlled sUbstance:
Tetrahydrocannabinols, or synthetic equivalents of the substances
contained in the plant, or in the resinous extractives of Cannabis,
sp. and/or synthetic substances, derivatives, and their isomers with
similar chemical structure such as the following:

i.

Tetrahydrocannabinols:

ii.

The following synthetic drugs:

5

a.
compound
or
naphthoyl)indole
the
I C. § 37-2705(d)(30) (2011).2
hundreds)

structurally
derived
from
1H-indol-3-yl-( 1-naphthyl)methane
atom of the indole ring by

1by

The statute also lists dozens (and possibly

specific chemical formulations of synthetic marijuana.

I.C. § 37-

2705(d)(30)(ii)(b-g) (2011).
In this case there is no dispute that AM-2201 is a "synthetic substance"
that mimics marijuana, "such as" the "synthetic drugs" "derived from 3-( naphthoyl)indole or 1H-indol-3-yl-( 1-naphthyl)methane by substitution at the
nitrogen atom of the indole ring by alkyl." Goggin's only claim is that the actual
substitution at the indole ring is not by an actual alkyl. (See supplemental brief,
p. 5 (citing Alley).) The dispute between the testifying chemists was whether the
presence of a single flourine atom in the carbon chain substitution atom, which all
acknowledged made the molecule an alkyl halide, was properly classified as an
alkyl or a halide. (Compare Tr., vol. I, p. 101, L. 12 - p. 102, L. 2; p. 174, L. 19p. 176, L. 7 with p. 194, L. 12 - p. 195, L. 7.) Goggin has never claimed that the
difference between an alkyl and an alkyl halide actually makes AM-2201
something other than a synthetic marijuana "such as" ones specified.
The plain language of Schedule I includes synthetic marijuana, regardless
of minor variations in the chemical formulation. First, the presence of a flourine
atom in the substitute at the indole ring does not mean that the "substitution" is
no longer "by alkyl" as that term is used in the statute. Rather, an alkyl halide

The 2011 amendment was in effect at the times relevant to this case. 2011
Idaho Session Laws, eh. 47, § 1, p. 109. A 2013 amendment is currently in
effect. I.C. § 37-2705(d)(31) (Supp. 2013).
2

6

(such as

one
R.,

p. 252, L. 20.)

of

is a

a

L. 25,
chemists

(and

207, L.

1-

in this case) as

an alkyl halide belongs in the alkyl group or the halide group, the question is what
the legislature

. Given the obviously broad intent of the statute, it

little sense to give the single word "alkyl" its narrowest and most technical
meaning. The chemical formulation of AM-2201 is specifically covered

the

non-exhaustive chemical formulation list of controlled synthetic marijuana.
Moreover, the one atom difference, even if the term alkyl halide is not an
alkyl as that word was used by the legislature, does not change the reality that
AM-2201 is a formulation of synthetic marijuana "such as" a formulation
accomplished by sUbstitution by an alkyl. The plain language of the statute is
clearly a comprehensive ban on synthetic marijuana, rather than a test of specific
chemical formulations controlled by an exclusive list, and the formula of synthetic
marijuana known as AM-2201 is therefore a Schedule I controlled sUbstance.
Goggin's reliance on State v. Alley, 155 Idaho 972,318 P.3d 962 (Ct. App.
2014), for the proposition that whether the specific chemical formulation of
synthetic marijuana known as AM-2201 is a controlled substance is a factual
question, is misplaced. In that case the Court of Appeals noted that the parties
presented "conflicting expert testimony on the meaning of the technical term
'alkyl.'"

kL

at _ , 318 P.3d at 968.

After holding that the word

"is

ambiguous" the Court of Appeals resorted first to "statutory construction" and
then to the "rule of

to interpret this single word of

7

statute.

at _ ,

18

3d at 968-69.
be

applying the rule of

to conclude

is one

as advocated by Alley did

"[o]ther portions" of the statute.

kL at _ ,

318 P.3d

970.

The Court of Appeals then looked at a primary clause of the statute in
rather than being a comprehensive ban on synthetic
marijuana, Schedule I created a fact question as to whether a formulation of
synthetic marijuana one atom different from the "compound structurally derived
from 3-(1-naphthoyl)indole or 1H-indol-3-yl-(1-naphthyl)methane by substitution
at the nitrogen atom of the indole ring by alkyl" formulation had "similar chemical
structure." See ~ at _,318 P.3d at 971-72.
The flaw in the Court of Appeals' analysis is that it failed to follow the
mandate that legislative intent "should be derived from a reading of the whole act
at issue." Farmers Nat. Bank, 155 Idaho at

, 318 P.3d at 625. The Court of

Appeals' divide and conquer approach of starting with a single word, then looking
at "other portions" of the statute (the main clause of the subsection at issue),
cannot be reconciled with the requirement that the legislative act should be
looked at as a whole. When looked at as a whole the only question is whether
the chemical formulation of AM-2201, which everyone agrees is synthetic
marijuana, is within the scope of Schedule I. Although there is a dispute as to
whether the substitution at the indole ring was by alkyl (based on a disagreement
among chemists as to
is noth

the term alkyl includes or excludes alkyl halides),
that substitution by an alkyl halide rather than alkyl

means AM-2201 is not a formulation "such as" that listed, and

8

scope

!.

by the

language

specific

provided
formulations as

as the following").

the

Court of Appeals, by

analyzing first a single word of the statute contained in the "such as" list, and
working backwards, made the examples the

statute,

reduced the primary language of the statute to a "catch-all.,,3
The plain language of this statute shows legislative intent to ban all
synthetic marijuana, regardless of its chemical formulations. It banned "synthetic
substances ... such as" the synthetic cannabinoids listed. I.C. § 37 -2705(d)(30).
The one atom difference identified, even if it took AM-2201 out of the specific list
of "such as" chemical formulations, did not remove AM-2201 from Schedule I or
reduce the determination of whether the specific chemical formulation of
synthetic marijuana known as AM-2201 was a controlled substance to a factual
question. The statute requires a factual determination of only whether Goggin
delivered (or conspired to deliver, manufacture or possess with intent) synthetic
marijuana, which is a Schedule I controlled substance.
Finally, neither the plain language of the statute nor the legislative history
even suggest that the legislature intended that juries decide whether AM-2201 is

3 The Court of Appeals also applied the "similar chemical structure" language to
the "synthetic substances" phrase in the statute, even though it modifies the word
"isomers." Alley, 155 Idaho at _ , 318 P.3d at 971 ("Whether AM-2201 has a
similar chemical structure to one of
example substances listed under the
statute is a question of fact." (emphasis added)). The relevant language is
"synthetic substances, derivatives,
their isomers with similar chemical
structure such as the following: .... " I C. § 37-2705(c)(30) (2011) (emphasis
added).

9

a Schedule I controlled substance on a
Appeals reasoned

a

of

issue have also agreed

federal

determining structural

is a

question for the finder of fact." Alley, 155 Idaho at _ , 318 P.3d at 971.
, the Idaho

not require a "determin[aiion] [of the] structural

similarity of chemicals" but instead a determination of whether the product
delivered is a synthetic marijuana. The portion of the federal Analogue Act cited
by the Court of Appeals,

kL

at _

n.5, 318 P.3d at 971 n.5, defines "controlled

substance analogue" and states it is a substance "the chemical structure of which
is substantially similar to the chemical structure of a controlled substance" and
meets other requirements.

21 U.S.C.A. § 802(32)(A).

The term specifically

excludes a "controlled substance" from being a "controlled substance analogue."

§ 21 U.S.C.A. § 802(32)(C)(i).

Because the federal statute is fundamentally

different than the Idaho statute, cases interpreting it are of little utility In
determining the scope and meaning of Idaho's ban on synthetic marijuana.
Nor are the cases cited by the Court of Appeals instructive in their
analysis. In United States v. Bamburg, 478 F.3d 934, 939-41 (8 th Cir. 2007), the
court declined to consider the argument that the mental state element was
different for "'traditional'" controlled substances than for '''nontraditional'
such as those covered by the Analogue Act" because any error was necessarily
harmless; that there was no "plain error" in the jury instruction on witness
that the trial court's questions of
415

10

state's expert did not
1257, 1264 (1

th

the
the

court noted that
were

after a bench trial, made factual findings

the

the defense witness lacked expertise, and the

"proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the chemical structure of 1,4butanediol is substantially similar to that of GHB."
that finding

at 1270-

The appellate court later

In -=..:...:~:::.....::...=::...::.......~...:=...;:...:::..;:..;=, 405 F.3d

515, 525-27 (th Cir. 2005), the Court stated that "applying the standard
requirement that a defendant must know the substance in question is a
'controlled substance' is nonsensical since controlled substance analogues are,
by definition, not 'controlled substances'" and therefore the proper scienter
requirement is that the defendant "knew the substance in question was a
controlled substance analogue.,,4 In United States v. Roberts, 363 F.3d 118, 123
n.1 (2d Cir, 2004), the court merely listed the statutory elements of the Analogue
Act (including that the substance "was similar in structure and effect to a listed
controlled substance") in the context of a void for vagueness challenge.

In

United States v. Ansaldi, 372 F.3d 118, 123 n.2 (2d Cir. 2004), the court noted
that the argument that it was an "improper delegation of legislative power" to
have the jury decide whether a substance is "substantially similar" to a controlled
substance, and therefore an analogue, was only a restatement of the appellant's
void for vagueness challenge.

This holding, that the defendant had to know the substance he possessed was
a controlled substance analogue, was rejected by the Fourth Circuit based on
contrary circuit precedent in United States V. McFadden,
F.3d
, 2014 WL
th
2109374 (4 Cir. 2014). Of course a requirement that Goggin knew that the
synthetic marijuana was "chemically similar" to listed
formulations
synthetic marijuana would eviscerate the general intent requirements contained
in Idaho's d
4

11

a
in

the

the

of

at issue in this case were in any
Act.

are

Analogue

cases, at best, note that the federal definition of analogue requires that
be chemically similar to a controlled

the

but not be a

controlled sUbstance itself, but do not address the issues raised in the present
case.

In short, the federal cases cited by the Court of Appeals are not

persuasive authority on the interpretation of the Idaho statutes at issue in this
case.
The plain language and legislative history of I.C. § 37 -2705(d)(30) both
show legislative intent to make all synthetic marijuana ("spice") a controlled
substance.

The legislative list of specific chemical formulations of synthetic

marijuana is merely representative, and not exclusive. Nor is there support in the
statute for the conclusion that the legislature intended that the formulations
specifically listed are controlled sUbstances as a matter of law, but that forms of
synthetic marijuana with slight chemical differences that do not change their
nature be subject to jury determination on a case-by-case basis whether they are
controlled or not. Because the statute makes synthetic marijuana, including AM2201, a Schedule I controlled substance, the Court of Appeals' decision in
and Goggin's arguments based thereon, must be rejected.

12

Jury Instructions
For
J

first

on appeal, in supplemental

Instruction 23, wh

, Goggin challenges

states: "Under Idaho law synthetic cannabinoids,

including AM-2201, JVVH-019, and JWH-210 are controlled substances." (R., p.
886.) Specifically, relying on the analysis in Alley that determination of whether
the chemical formulation of synthetic marijuana known as AM-2201 is a
controlled substance is a factual question resolved on a case-by-case basis,
Goggin argues the court should have submitted that factual question to the jury
instead of instructed it as a matter of law.

(Supplemental brief, pp. 5-6.)

Because whether AM-2201 is a controlled substance is not a factual question
resolved on a case-by-case basis, as set forth above, there is no error in the
instruction.
Even if the instruction was incorrect, however, Goggin has failed to show
fundamental error. "It is a fundamental tenet of appellate law that a proper and
timely objection must be made in the trial court before an issue is preserved for
appeaL" State v. Carlson, 134 Idaho 389, 398, 3 P.3d 67, 76 (Ct. App. 2000).
Absent a timely objection, the appellate courts of this state will only review an
alleged error under the fundamental error doctrine. State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209,
245 P.3d 961, 979 (2010). To show fundamental error the appellant must
show that some
constitutional

or inaction "(1) violates one or more of [her] unwaived
plainly exists (without the need for any additional
in the appellate record, including information as to

whether the

was a tactical decision); and (3) was not harmless."
13

1

Idaho

a

in
failed to

either

resolving a

980.

or

has
this case.

error under the

The claimed error is not clear. First, at no point, either at tria! or in relation
to dism

did Goggin claim that AM-2201

"similar

chemical structure" to the synthetic marijuana formulations in the list.

It is

undisputed that AM-2201 is in fact a synthetic marijuana and, at most, only one
atom different from a formula specifically provided in the statutory list. Goggin
instead took the position that the list was exclusive, AM-2201 was not on the list,
and therefore it was not as a matter of law a controlled sUbstance.

She had

nothing to gain from claiming that AM-2201 was a controlled substance if it had
"similar chemical structure" to the formulas in the list.
Second, it is far from clear that Alley is a correct statement of the law.
Prior to Alley there was no real reason to believe the statute made formulas for
synthetic marijuana on the "such as" list controlled substances as a matter of law
but formulas not specifically on the list to be decided as questions of fact. Before
Alley it was not clear that whether AM-2201 is a controlled substance is a factual
determination made on a case-by-case basis, and until decided by this Court that
question is still not settled.
Goggin has also failed to show any prejudice.

only evidence in this

case is that AM-2201 is a "synthetic cannabinoid" that is a "Schedule I
substance." (Tr., vol. iii, p. 2441,
2453,

1

17-20; p. 2458, L. 4 - p.

p. 2449, L. 23 - p. 2450,
6; p. 2461,

14

20 -

16; p.

2462, L.

p.

L. 23, p. 2498,

6-22; p. 2481, L.

1

was no evidence
could find that AM-2201 is a controlled substance"

8)

is without basis because at least two witnesses testified that it was.
In

ition, Goggin

delivery

not dispute that

conspiracy

charges also cover synthetic marijuana with formulations known as JWH-019 and
JWH-210, which are indisputably synthetic marijuana as a matter of law. Thus,
any error in lack of a jury determination of whether AM-2201 is also a Schedule I
controlled substance is necessarily harmless.

Goggin argues that she would

have been able to successfully assert a mistake of fact defense regarding the
JWH-019 and JWH-210, but for the instruction.

(Supplemental brief, pp. 7-8.)

Such an argument is pure speculation. Although a belief that the substance was
something that was legal to possess would be a defense, there is no basis for
claiming that a belief that the substance was a formulation that might be legal if
the jury does not find it "similar" to other formulations used in synthetic marijuana
would be a defense. Goggin never claimed, and presented no evidence, that she
thought the substance was something other than synthetic marijuana. Goggin
has failed to show a likelihood of a different outcome.

E.

The Evidence Is Sufficient
Goggin asserts that "the state did not prove that Ms. Goggin knew the

nature of the material she possessed" and there was "no proof whatsoever
prove [she] had the

intent (knowledge) to commit" a conspiracy to
or possess with

15

to deliver synthetic

pp.

is an

1

of

argument
she

it was
marijuana.

was
1

(Appellant's

pp.

7.) Goggin does not articulate how, even if Alley employed the right analysis
is a

component to determining if

substance, such would render the evidence insufficient.

1 is a controlled
The evidence is that

Goggin knew exactly what she was dealing in: synthetic marijuana. (See R., pp.
1002-09.) That she did not know exactly what chemical formulation of synthetic
marijuana, or thought the particular formula used was not illegal, does not render
the evidence insufficient.

F.

Goggin Is Not Entitled To A New Trial
Instruction No. 27 states: "When the evidence shows that a person

voluntarily did that which the law declares to be a crime, it is no defense that the
person did not know that the act was unlawful or that the person believed it to be
lawful." (R., p. 890.) Goggin asserts that this instruction was rendered incorrect
by Alley and therefore she is entitled to a new trial. Regardless of whether AM2201 is a controlled substance as a matter of fact or a matter of law, ignorance of
the law is still not a defense to the charges. (See Respondent's brief, pp. 11-17.)

16

district court

DATED this 30th day of May, 201

Deputy Attorney Gener I

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 30th day of May, 2014, I caused two true
and correct copies of the foregoing SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF to be placed in the
United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed to:
GREG S. SILVEY
Silvey Law Office, Ltd.
PO Box 565
Star, ID 83669

KENNETH K. JORGE SE
Deputy Attorney Gene al
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